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I. INTRODUCTION
A specter of liability looms over American publishers as they move further and 
further into the physically borderless world of Internet publication.1  While the American 
press has long enjoyed heightened First Amendment protection from defamation2
lawsuits domestically, the First Amendment  abroad is "nothing more than a local 
statute”3 and free speech norms are substantially less robust internationally than in the 
United States.  Most significantly, foreign defamation standards do not require that a 
defamatory statement be accompanied by “actual malice”— knowledge that the statement 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not— for recovery, as 
required in the United States pursuant to the watershed Supreme Court case of New York 
Times v. Sullivan.4
This substantive conflict of laws would be of little practical significance were 
foreign courts unable to reach the merits of an Internet defamation case for lack of 
jurisdiction.  Indeed, American courts have been disinclined to assert personal 
jurisdiction over Internet defamation defendants unless their allegedly defamatory 
statements were posted to websites whose content was intentionally directed toward 
1 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) (The Internet has 
no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there 
perhaps “no there there,” the “there” is everywhere where there is Internet access.) (citations omitted).
2
 Defamation is defined as any communication that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower 
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him,” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 559 (1977), but truth is a defense to liability, see id. 581A. Defamation 
may occurs as either libel and slander. Libel generally covers written or printed defamation, while slander 
generally covers oral defamation, but the distinction is not always easy to make. See id. 568 cmt. b. The 
modern practice has been to combine libel and slander under the common tort of defamation.  However, 
commentators have suggested that defamation on the Internet is best classified as libel, principally because 
an electronic message can always be printed. See, e.g., Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel and the 
First Amendment, 11 Computer/L.J. 555, 562 (1992)
3
 Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:  Who May Regulate the 
Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 177 (1997).
4
 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4individuals and/or locations within the forum state.5  Moreover, in the U.S., the fact that a 
newspaper’s website can be accessed in a forum state “does not by itself demonstrate that 
a newspaper [is] intentionally directing website content . . .  to a [particular] audience.”6
A less constrained approach to jurisdiction in the Internet defamation context, 
however, one that places many American publishers squarely in the crosshairs, is 
developing internationally.  Two recent cases, both involving the American media giant 
Dow Jones,7 embody this approach:  In Dow Jones & Company, Inc.  v. Gutnick,8 the 
Australian High Court asserted jurisdiction over a defamation claim based on material 
that was placed on the Internet by Dow Jones & Co. outside of Australian borders but 
viewed within.  Similarly, in Harrods, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co.,9 the High Court of 
Justice in London, citing Gutnick as persuasive authority, found that “the apparently 
limited number of hits emanating from this jurisdiction on the relevant page of [Dow
Jones’s] web site” was sufficient to create jurisdiction.  
Together, these cases represent a lowering of the jurisdictional barrier that might 
otherwise shield American Internet publishers from exposure to legal standards of 
defamation less sensitive to free press interests than the American standard.  They 
suggest an unbounded rule of jurisdiction for Internet defamation, one that subjects an 
individual or entity that publishes on the Internet to the laws of any locale where content 
5 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“A passive 
website that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not 
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(characterizing a journal website as passive in nature and holding that it did not give rise to personal 
jurisdiction where an individual posted an allegedly defamatory article to it). See also discussion infra Part 
II for a comparison of the three major approaches to jurisdiction taken by U.S. courts.  
6
 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
7
 The flagship publication of Dow Jones is the Wall Street Journal, founded in 1889, with a current 
international circulation of approximately 2.1 million.  See generally
http://www.dowjones.com/TheCompany/AboutDowJones.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005).  
8
 [2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002) (Austl. High Court).
9
 [2003] EWHC 1162 (QB) (22 May 2003).
5can be viewed, which is, by virtue of the Internet’s pervasive reach, nearly anywhere and 
everywhere in the world.10
This Article will examine the difficult jurisdictional issues which arise in the 
course of all Internet defamation claims as well as the substantive conflicts of law thrown 
into relief by international Internet defamation claims such as the Dow Jones cases.  Part 
II will describe analyses used by American courts to address the question of jurisdiction 
generally and in the Internet context specifically.  Part III will describe the Victorian 
Supreme Court and Australian High Court opinions in Dow Jones & Co., Inc.  v. Gutnick 
and argue that the approach to internet defamation jurisdiction taken by those courts is 
irreconcilable with the American approach.  In addition, it will outline the substantive 
conflicts that have arisen between U.S. and Australian/English laws of defamation as a 
result of Sullivan and its progeny.  Part IV will address a question that inevitably arises 
when foreign courts render judgments incompatible with American constitutional 
standards of free speech:  When may an American court refuse to enforce a foreign 
judgment counter to public policy?  Absent a political solution, this Article will argue, 
American courts may be increasingly called upon to exercise this discretionary power to 
counter international threats to American free press protections.  More generally, this 
Article will conclude that American courts, the Supreme Court in particular, will need to 
unequivocally reaffirm the values embodied by New York Times v. Sullivan and transpose 
10 See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3rd Cir. 2000), vacated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 
(2002) (“[T]he Internet has an “international, geographically-borderless nature,” and “with the proper 
software every Website is accessible to all other Internet users worldwide.”). See also Christopher W. 
Meyer, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH & 
LEE L. REV. 1269 (1997).
6those values to the Internet context in order to prevent the further erosion of American 
free speech norms in cyberspace.
II. U.S. APPROACHES TO INTERNET JURISDICTION
A. Traditional Bases for Jurisdiction
In order for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil dispute, there must be 
a nexus between the persons or property involved and the forum.  That is, a court 
generally must have either in personam jurisdiction or in rem jurisdiction.11
Controversies involving Internet publishers generally revolve around questions of in 
personam jurisdiction, as plaintiffs ask courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over 
defendants physically located outside state or national boundaries.  
In addition, most difficult questions of Internet jurisdiction are concerned with the 
application of specific jurisdiction, as opposed to general jurisdiction.12  General 
jurisdiction is conferred where a defendant has maintained “continuous and systematic 
contacts”13 with the forum, and the standard is high, requiring “contacts with the state 
that approximate physical presence.”14  Courts have rarely found general jurisdiction 
based solely on Internet conduct.15  Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, permits a 
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where the activity of 
a defendant in the forum falls within the “minimum contacts” framework articulated by 
11 REDISH ET AL.,CIVIL PROCEDURE 145 (2003).
12 See Nathan A. Olin , The A-B-CS of Targeting: A Formula  for  Resolving  Personal  Jurisdiction-
Internet  Issues (“Courts have almost universally rejected the argument that merely entering cyberspace by 
putting up a web-site permits general jurisdiction over the site creator.”).
13
 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984).
14 Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
15 But see Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 34 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that general 
jurisdiction existed over L.L. Bean based on its “extensive marketing and sales in California, its extensive 
contacts with California vendors, and the fact that . . .  its website is clearly and deliberately structured to 
operate as a sophisticated virtual store in California.”).
7the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,16 described below.  The 
overwhelming majority of disputes raising questions of jurisdiction based on Internet 
websites involve analyses of specific jurisdiction.17
U.S. courts exercise specific jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the forum 
state only where jurisdiction is proper under the applicable “long-arm” statute18 and 
consistent with constitutional due process.  The long-arm statutes of most American 
States, however, typically permit jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process, so 
that “the statutory inquiry . . . merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the two 
inquiries essentially become one.”19  Courts employ a two-prong specific jurisdiction 
analysis.  Under the first prong, the courts must examine the quality and quantity of the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.20  That is, courts must first evaluate “how numerous 
and deliberate the defendant's contacts with the forum state were.”21 The second prong of 
the test requires the courts to determine the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over 
the foreign defendant.22  The court must ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
forum would offend “traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice.”23 A 
defendant's contacts must rise to the level “that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there.”24
16
 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17 See COMPUTER LAW §3D.03 (2)(b) (2004) (“The vast majority of Internet jurisdiction cases deal with 
specific jurisdiction.”).
18 Id.
19 Stover v O’Connell Associates, Inc, 84 F 3d 132, 135–6 (4th Cir., 1996).
20 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–78 (1985) (explaining first prong of analysis)
21 Id. at 475–76 nn. 17–18.
22 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
23 Int’l Shoe., 326 U.S. at 320 (1945).
24 World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297 (describing “gestalt factors” that must be analyzed when 
evaluating fairness of asserting personal jurisdiction).
8B. The Modern Test for Personal Jurisdiction: “Minimum Contacts”
The contemporary standard for evaluating a defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state was announced in the landmark decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington.25  In 
International Shoe, the Supreme Court created an exception to the requirement of 
physical presence within a specific forum26 in order for personal jurisdiction to attach, 
requiring instead that a defendant have “certain minimum contacts with . . . [a forum 
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”27  “Minimum contacts” have been defined as “conduct and 
connection with the forum . . . such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there.”28  In determining whether minimum contacts exist, courts 
look for “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”29  Courts continue to rely on the minimum contacts analysis of International 
Shoe and its progeny30 as they analyze the question of whether certain Internet activities, 
including Internet publishing, form a basis for personal jurisdiction.31
25
 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26
 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 614 (1877) (requiring physical presence in a forum state as a predicate for the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
27 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
28 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (1980).
29 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
30 See, e.g., id (holding “general” jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant’s contact with the forum 
state are “continuous and systematic”); Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462 at 475 (1985) (holding “specific 
jurisdiction” exists when a nonresident defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”).
31 See, e.g., Hinsch v. Outrigger Hotels Haw., 153 F. Supp. 2d 209, 213–14 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he court 
addresses and dismisses Plaintiff's argument that all cases from 1958 to 1990 are irrelevant in light of 
changing times.  In the absence of a change in the law, the cases cited by the court remain the law to apply 
here. This is true even if changes in technology, such as the use of the internet instead of a telephone, have 
altered the way in which business is conducted.”)
9C. Approaches to Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases
As of 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to specifically address the issue of 
personal jurisdiction with respect to Internet activities.32  However, a number of U.S. 
district and circuit courts have.  Three closely related approaches to the jurisdictional 
question, sometimes in tension, but often used in conjunction, can be identified and are 
outlined below.  
1. The Zippo Sliding-Scale Approach
Although not a case involving Internet defamation, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot 
Com, Inc.33 is a cornerstone in the jurisprudence to date involving jurisdiction based on 
an Internet website.34  In Zippo, the defendant owned and operated a website containing 
information about defendant, ads and an application for a news service.  To access the 
news service, viewers of the website were required to complete an online application and 
pay a fee by credit card.35  Although the defendant’s employees, offices, and servers were 
outside the forum state, two percent of the subscribers to its website were residents of the 
state and the defendant entered into agreements with seven Internet access providers in 
the state so that subscribers there could access the news service.36  In addition, the 
32 See Brian E. Daughdrill, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop on 
First Amendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L. REV.. 919, 919-20 (2000) (Courts attempting to impose 
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis on Internet-related contacts have no guidance from the Supreme 
Court and continue to reach inconsistent results as they attempt to force territorial-based analysis onto a 
one- dimensional universe lacking any concept of boundaries, territories, or other physical properties.”).
33 952 F. Supp. 1119 (1997).
34 Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“The opinion in Zippo . . . has 
become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web 
site.”); Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Based Approach to Personal 
Juridiction, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 473, 478 (“The opinion in Zippo “has earned a place in history as one of the 
most-cited district court opinions ever. As of October 2, 2003, Zippo had been cited an astonishing 570 
times, including 67 opinions that are described as following it and 320 times by law review articles.”).
35 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123.
36 Id. 
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defendant owned domain names incorporating plaintiff's trademark.  Plaintiff sued for 
trademark infringement and related causes.37
Citing the traditional rule that the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper “when 
an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign 
residents,”38 the federal district court in Zippo concluded that the propriety of exercising 
jurisdiction over a website depends on where on a “sliding scale” of commercial 
interactivity a website falls.39  The sliding scale encompasses the broad spectrum of 
contacts with a forum state that might be created by an Internet website.  At one end of 
this spectrum, there are commercial websites characterized as “active” by the Zippo 
court, through which a defendant “clearly does business over the Internet.”40   At the 
other end of the spectrum lie websites characterized as “passive”, on which the defendant 
merely posts information or advertising.   According to Zippo, the contacts created by 
websites of this nature are never enough to establish jurisdiction.41  In between these two 
poles lie “interactive websites” that permit Internet users to exchange information with 
the site’s host computer.42  In these cases, the jurisdictional question should be resolved 
by analyzing “the level of interactivity and commercial nature” of the information 
exchange. 43
Ironically, having articulated this framework for analyzing Internet jurisdiction, in 
which so much rides on the characterization of a website, the Zippo opinion does not 
clearly identify the website in question as “active”, “passive”, or “interactive”.  However, 
37 Id. 
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1124.
40 Id. 
41 Id.  (“[A] passive website that does little more than make information available to those who are 
interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”).
42 Id. at 1124.
43 Id. at 1126.
11
the Zippo court found substantial the “repeated[] and conscious[]” processing of  
subscription orders (approximately 3,000) from Pennsylvania residents as well as 
purposeful transmission of electronic messages into the state.44  These actions, along with 
the fact that the defendant had established contracts with Internet service providers within 
the forum state, were deemed commercial contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction.45
a. Application of Zippo to Internet Defamation:  Revell v. Lidov46
The Zippo test, commonly referred to as a “sliding scale” or, alternatively, 
“passive versus active” test, has been applied in the Internet defamation context by 
numerous federal courts47 as well as at least one Canadian court.48  The Fifth Circuit case 
of Revell v. Lidov49 is a particularly instructive example of the Zippo analysis as applied 
to Internet defamation jurisdiction analysis.   The plaintiff in Revell filed a suit for 
defamation in Texas based on an article posted on the Columbia Journalism Review 
website, operated and maintained in New York.50  The article alleged, among other 
things, that the plaintiff, as part of the Reagan Administration, had willfully failed to 




 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
47 See, e.g., id.(finding no jurisdiction where defendant had placed defamatory remarks on its website 
accessible in forum state); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); but 
see Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction over columnist who 
composed defamatory statements in California, yet made statements available on website accessible in 
forum state).
48 Braintech Inc. v. Kostiuk, 1999 ACWSJ Lexis 1924 (British Columbia Court of Appeals 1999) (applying 
the Zippo sliding scale analysis and refusing to exercise jurisdiction because bulletin board on which 
plaintiff  had posted allegedly defamatory material was a '”Zippo-passive'” website).
49
 317 F.3d 467.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 468.
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Summarily dismissing any argument that it could exercise general jurisdiction 
over the defendant,52 the court turned to the more difficult question of specific 
jurisdiction.  Working within the Zippo framework (over objections by the plaintiff),53 the 
court focused solely on the maintenance of the Internet bulletin board where the allegedly 
defamatory article was published.   Applying the sliding scale, the court determined that 
the Columbia University website could note be characterized as entirely passive because 
it included a bulletin board with interactive elements.54 The board allowed users to post 
information and receive information that others had posted. Given this level of 
interactivity, the court concluded, the website fell within the middle ground of the Zippo 
continuum.55
In evaluating the quality and extent of the website’s interactivity with Texas, the 
Revell court emphasized that neither Columbia University nor the author of the allegedly
defamatory article knew that the subject of the article was living in Texas, and Texas was 
not the “geographic focus” of the article.56  The court observed no evidence that the 
article published on Columbia’s website was intended to cause harm in Texas.57
Furthermore, Texans were not the principal users of the bulletin board at issue and the 
article was not something that would be of special interest to persons living in Texas,  
52 Id. at 471 n. 20 (“Irrespective of the sliding scale, the question of general jurisdiction is not difficult here. 
Though the maintenance of a website is, in a sense, a continuous presence everywhere in the world, the 
cited contacts of Columbia with Texas are not in any way ‘substantial.’).  See also text accompanying notes 
22–26 for a discussion of general versus specific jurisdiction in the Internet context.
53
 317 F.3d at 471 (“Revell urges that, given the uniqueness of defamation claims and their inherent ability 
to inflict injury in far-flung jurisdictions, we should abandon the imagery of Zippo. It is a bold but 
ultimately unpersuasive argument. Defamation has its unique features, but shares relevant characteristics 
with various business torts.”).
54 Id. at 472.
55 Id.
56
 This part of the court’s analysis overlaps substantially with another approach, discussed infra Part II.C 
(1)(c), sometimes referred to as “targeting” analysis, which seeks to identify the geographic “focal point” of 
a defamatory article.   See generally Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
57 Revell, 317 F.3d at 476.
13
i.e., it did not address events that took place in Texas.58  Consequently, the court held that 
the website interactivity did not create sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to subject 
the defendants to specific jurisdiction in that state under the Zippo test.59
2. Calder v. Jones60 and the “Effects” Test
Though the Revell court specifically cited Zippo as the test used by the Fifth 
Circuit in analyzing Internet jurisdiction, it was also careful to acknowledge the potential 
applicability of an “effects” analysis, sometimes thought of as distinct from Zippo 
analysis,61  but regarded as “but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis” in 
Revell.62  Under an effects test, jurisdiction is created when a non-resident defendant is 
engaged in intentional conduct, aimed at the forum state, causing harm that the defendant 
knows is likely to be felt in the forum.63  Effects-based analysis can be traced to the 
Supreme Court non–Internet defamation case of Calder v. Jones.64
In Calder, the actress Shirley Jones, a resident of California, brought an action for 
defamation there against the National Enquirer tabloid, which is headquartered in Florida.  
The Supreme Court held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction was proper. In coming 
to this conclusion, it observed that the allegedly defamatory story concerned a California 
resident whose television career was centered in California.65  Moreover, the Court noted, 
58 Id.
59 Id. at 477.
60 465 U.S. 783 (1983).
61 See generally 2-3D COMPUTER LAW § 3D.03 (breaking down Internet jurisdictional analyses into three 
distinct approaches).
62 Revell, 317 F.3d at 473.
63 Id. at 475.
64 465 U.S. 783 (1983).
65 Id. at 784.
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the article was largely drawn from California sources, most of its harm was suffered in 
California, and the publication had its largest circulation in California.66
Thus, because California was the “focal point both of the story and the harm 
suffered” and the tabloid’s story was “aimed at California”, the Court concluded that the 
defendant could “reasonably foresee being haled into California court.”67  Jurisdiction in 
California was considered appropriate based in part on the effects of defendants’ conduct 
in that state.68  Despite this focus on the effects of a defamatory statement, it should be 
emphasized that the intentional conduct of the defendant is still critical in an effects-
based analysis.  As the Supreme Court in Calder observed: “Petitioners are not charged 
with mere untargeted negligence.   Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, 
actions were expressly aimed at California.”69  Thus, the Calder effects tests should not 
be misconstrued as a test that looks solely to the effects of a defendant’s conduct in 
determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate.  Rather, the effects of an 
injury may be regarded as evidence that a defendant aimed its tortious conduct at a 
specific jurisdiction and this could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”70
a. Application of the Effects Test to Internet Defamation:  Revell Revisited
The Revell court, restating some of the factors it cited in its Zippo analysis, 
concluded its case was distinguishable from Calder.  It observed that the article written 
66 Id. at 785.
67 Id. at 789.
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 789–90 (“Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have 
a potentially devastating impact upon respondent.  And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt 
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest 
circulation.  Under the circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’ 
to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article.”)(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297).
15
and posted by the defendants in its case contained no reference to Texas, did not refer to 
any of the Texas activities of the plaintiff, and was in no way directed at Texas readers.71
By contrast, the defamatory article in Calder “contained descriptions of the California 
activities of the plaintiff, drew upon California sources, and found its largest audience in 
California”.72  Thus, the Revell court concluded that Calder did not control.73
Nevertheless, as Revell clearly acknowledges, Calder is binding authority and any court 
faced with the vexing question of jurisdiction in an Internet defamation case must either 
distinguish it or employ its “effects” test. 
3. Young v. New Haven Advocate74 and the “Targeting Inquiry”
A number of commentators have advocated an approach that more specifically
focuses on the question of whether or not a defamation defendant specifically “targeted” 
an individual or individuals within the forum state.75  Such an approach would “seek to 
identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken to either enter or avoid a 
particular jurisdiction.”76  As of 2005, the Third,77 Fourth,78 and Ninth79 federal circuits 
71
 317 F.3d at 476 (“In short, this was not about Texas. If the article had a geographic focus it was 
Washington, D.C.”).
72 465 U.S. at 788–89.
73
 317 F.3d at 473.
74
 315 F.3d 256 (2002).
75 See Michael Geist, Is There a There There?  Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1345, 1345–46 (2001) (“Targeting would [] lessen the reliance on effects-based 
analysis, the source of considerable uncertainty since Internet activity can ordinarily be said to create some 
effects in most jurisdictions.”); Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 
21 U. PA. J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 563, 573 (2000) (“The concept of targeting is the best solution to the 
theoretical challenge presented by difficulties in localizing conduct in Internet markets.”). 
76
 Geist, supra note 75, at 1345.
77 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding jurisdiction can be 
found where it can be shown that a defendant “purposely availed” itself of conducting activity in the forum 
state, by directly targeting its website to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state 
via its website, or through sufficient related contacts”).       
78 See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding 
jurisdiction is proper when a defendant “(1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested 
intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person 
within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts”).
16
have incorporated a targeting inquiry into their Internet jurisdiction analyses.  One Fourth 
Circuit opinion, Young v. New Haven Advocate,80 best illustrates the operation of such an 
approach in the Internet defamation context.
In Young, a Virginia prison warden brought a suit in Virginia against two 
Connecticut newspapers for a series of allegedly defamatory articles regarding the 
transfer of Connecticut prisoners to a Virginia facility.81  These articles described 
allegations made by prisoners of abusive guards and reported a class action suit that had 
been filed regarding abject conditions at the prison.82  In one column, the Virginia prison 
in question was characterized as a “cut-rate gulag”.83  In addition, one column reported a 
Connecticut senator’s consternation over the presence of Confederate Civil War 
memorabilia in the warden’s office.84  All of these articles appeared on the newspapers’ 
Internet websites and were easily accessible to residents of Virginia via the website.
The Young court rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion that his case fit under the 
effects-test rubric of Calder and his argument that jurisdiction existed in Virginia “simply 
because the newspapers posted articles on their Internet websites  . . . and he could feel 
the effects of any libel in Virginia.”85  The court asserted that “Calder does not sweep 
that broadly” and instead seized on the language in Calder that stresses the importance of 
79 See Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating jurisdiction is 
created “when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom 
the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state”).
80
 315 F.3d 256 (2002).




85 Id. at 261.
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“look[ing] at whether the defendant has expressly aimed or directed its conduct toward 
the forum state.”86
In concluding that the defendant newpapers did not, in fact, aim or direct their 
conduct toward Virginia, the Young court underscored facts indicating that Connecticut, 
rather than Virginia readers, were the presumptive audience for its articles.  It pointed out
that most of the advertising in both the physical and Internet versions of the newspapers 
was clearly aimed at Connecticut residents.87  Also, the vast majority of all physical 
copies of both newspapers were distributed in Connecticut:  One newspaper was a free 
newspaper distributed only in Connecticut and the other reported only eight Virginia 
subscribers.88  Finally, the websites of both newspapers offered features only of interest 
to Connecticut viewers such as local weather and traffic links, links to the University of 
Connecticut, and reviews of local establishments and events (e.g., “The Best of New 
Haven”).89   Based on a consideration of these facts, the Young court found that the 
defendant newspapers “did not post materials on the Internet with the manifest intent of 
targeting Virginia readers.”90  Accordingly, jurisdiction was not created.  
4. Intention, Purpose, Directedness:  Unifying Themes in the U.S. Approach to Internet 
Defamation Jurisdiction 
Though sometimes regarded as inconsistent,91 all three American approaches to 
86 Id.
87 Id. at 260.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 263.
91 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Internet Jurisdiction, 98 N.W. U.
L. Rev. 473, 473 (“One might think that by now there would have emerged a clear rule on whether the 
target can sue at home or not. However, there is no clear rule; in fact, there is not even really a clear 
majority position.”).
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the question of jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases adhere to a minimum contacts 
standard of constitutional due process.  That standard, so elaborately articulated by the 
Supreme Court in the sixty or so years since International Shoe, remains tied to a 
deceptively simple question:  When is it reasonable and fair to hale a defendant into a 
court in a forum state?92  At a bare minimum, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
suggests that a defendant has “fair warning” that he could be subject to jurisdiction in a 
forum state when he or she engages in purposeful activities directed at the forum state.93
The various approaches to Internet jurisprudence represent variations on this theme of 
purpose or intentionality.  Zippo:  “When an entity intentionally reaches beyond its 
boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction 
is proper.”94 Calder:  “[J]urisdiction over petitioners in California is proper because of 
their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent in 
California.”95 Young:  “Because the newspapers did not intentionally direct Internet 
activity to Virginia, jurisdiction fails on that ground.”  
Admittedly, the question of intentionality is a difficult one, but the view that mere 
presence on the Internet does not rise to the level of intentional, purposeful behavior is 
coalescing in American Internet jurisdiction jurisprudence.96  Indeed, if a defendant's 
mere presence on the Internet “were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, “a 
defendant would be subjected to jurisdiction on a worldwide basis and the personal 
92
 See Michael L. Russell, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme Approaches to the Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 157, 177 (1999) (discussing reasonableness 
and fairness of asserting jurisdiction in the Internet context).
93 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant who has not consented to suit there, this “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant 
has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum.”) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
94 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (emphasis added).
95 Calder, 465 U.S. at 491 (emphasis added).
96 Young, 315 F.3d at 264 * (emphasis added).
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jurisdiction requirements as they currently exist would be eviscerated.”97  As the next 
section will argue, there is an approach to personal jurisdiction developing internationally 
that would do just that.
III. THE DOW JONES APPROACH TO INTERNET DEFAMATION
A. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Gutnick98
In 2000, prominent Australian businessman Joseph “Diamond Joe” Gutnick 
became aware of an article, published on Barrons Online that alleged he was using 
charities to artificially inflate the value of low-priced stocks in the United States.99  The 
article also alleged Gutnick had ties to other businessmen who had been convicted or 
charged with fraud.100  Gutnick promptly filed a suit for defamation against Dow Jones, 
the owner of Barrons Online in Australia, where he was resident and where he claimed 
the injury to his reputation had occurred.101  By the time the case worked its way up to 
the Australian High Court, U.S. publishers had recognized its significance as the first 
case raising the issue of international defamation liability for Internet publications.  
Several of them, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Associated 
Press, Reuters, and Cable News Network (CNN)., intervened on behalf of Dow Jones, 
arguing that a ruling in favor of Gutnick would allow publishers to be sued anywhere in 
the world.102  There efforts would be unsuccessful.  In 2002, the Australian High Court 
ruled against Dow Jones, sparking off an international controversy.103
97
 Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104, 114 (D. Conn. 1998).
98
 [2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002) (Australian High Court).
99




 Andrew Dodd, Internet Defamation Case has Global Impact, THE AUSTRALIAN, June 6, 2002, at M03.
103 See Nathan W. Garnett, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick:  Will Australia’s Long Jurisdictional Reach Chill 
Internet Speech Worldwide?, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (“Opinions on the decision ranged from 
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1. The Procedural Conflict
a. Place of Publication and the Australian Jurisdictional Analysis 
The threshold question of jurisdiction was obviously one of great significance.  
How would the Australian High Court determine whether it could exercise jurisdiction 
over a large foreign media enterprise headquartered in the United States, doing most of 
its business in the U.S., and responsible for publications primarily directed at U.S. 
audiences?  Under international law, a domestic court is subject to limitations on its 
authority to adjudicate in cases that involve foreign interests or activities.104  There are no 
bright-line rules of international law, however, circumscribing spheres of national 
jurisdiction.105  Rather, international law leaves States wide discretion to decide when an 
exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate based on generally accepted principles.106
Nevertheless, courts generally exercise moderation and restraint in invoking jurisdiction 
approval of the High Court's ‘obvious’ rule to derision for the shortsighted protectionism of the Australian 
‘Kangaroo Court.’”).
104
 Traditionally, three kinds of jurisdiction are distinguished as a matter of international law: jurisdiction to 
prescribe, or legislative jurisdiction; jurisdiction to adjudicate, or judicial jurisdiction; and jurisdiction to 
enforce, or executive jurisdiction.  BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 726 
(2D ED. 1995); Australia’s jurisdiction to prescribe defamatory publication and enforce its defamation law 
was not disputed in this case.  Rather, the jurisdictional analysis centered on the question of the High 
Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate.  Jurisdiction to adjudicate is defined as “a State’s authority to 
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in 
criminal proceedings, whether or not the State is a party to the proceedings.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 401(B) (1987)  
105 See id. at 401 cmt. a. (“This section and the chapters that follow do not divide exercises of authority by a 
state into discrete conceptual categories. Rather, they identify different aspects of the exercise of authority 
that, because they employ different means and have different consequences, have led to different rules of 
international law.”).
106
 Four traditional bases for jurisdiction are generally recognized in international law.  These are (1) the 
territoriality principle, according to which the place where an offense is committed-in whole or in part-
determines jurisdiction; (2) the nationality principle, which looks to the nationality or national character of 
the person committing the offense to establish jurisdiction; (3) the effects principle, focusing on the direct 
and foreseeable effects of conduct within the territory of the forum and (4) the protective principle, which 
applies when a national or international interest of the forum is injured by the offender.  See CARTER & 
TRIMBLE, supra note 101, at 755.  The Australian High Court’s analysis implicitly invokes the “effects 
principle” as a basis for jurisdiction: “Activities that have effects beyond the jurisdiction in which they are 
done may properly be the concern of the legal systems in each place.”  [2002] HCA 56, at para. 24.  
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over cases that have a foreign element in order to avoid undue encroachment on the 
jurisdiction of other States.107
In both the Australian High Court’s opinion, as well as in the opinion below, the 
jurisdictional analysis focused on the question of where the allegedly defamatory 
statement had been “published.”108 Dow Jones argued that the article in question had 
been “published” when it was uploaded to Dow Jones servers, located in the United 
States.109  In making this argument, it urged the court to adopt a “single publication rule”, 
the rule employed in the U.S., which states that any edition of a book, newspaper, radio, 
or television broadcast is a single publication for which only one action for damages can 
be maintained.110   Under the Australian common law “multiple publication” rule, by 
contrast, each observation of a defamatory statement creates a separate cause of action 
and creates a new location in which the action may be brought.111  Under a single 
publication rule, Dow Jones argued, the place of publication was New Jersey and only
New Jersey, where Dow Jones’ servers were located and where material was uploaded to 
107 See Wilske & Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:  Who May Regulate the Internet?, 50 
FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 127 (“A State that exercises jurisdiction in an overly self-centered way not only 
contravenes international law, but it can also disturb the international order and produce political, legal, and 
economic reprisals.”)
108
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 13 (“[C]consideration of the jurisdiction issue . . . means the question of the 
place of Internet publication.”).  [2002] HCA 56 passim.
109
 [2002] HCA 56 at para. 18 (“The principal burden of the argument advanced by Dow Jones on the 
hearing of the appeal in this Court was that articles published on Barron's Online were published in South 
Brunswick, New Jersey, when they became available on the servers which it maintained at that place.”).
110
 As stated in the Restatement of Torts 577A, the rule is as follows:
(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a 
motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any other action 
for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.
111
 There is a separate publication (and thus a separate cause of action) in relation to each copy delivered to 
a reader. If a newspaper circulates 100,000 copies of the one edition (defamatory of the plaintiff), he has 
available to him at least 100,000 causes of action. The "single publication" rule adopted in the United 
States, whereby a plaintiff is given only one cause of action for each entire edition of the newspaper, has 
not been adopted in this country. 
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its website.112  To the contrary, Gutnick argued that publication of the article only 
occurred “when it [was] made intelligible or manifest to a third party by showing it or 
making it comprehensible,”113 i.e, whenever and wherever it was received and read.  In 
conjunction with the multiple publication rule, this would mean that a publisher would be 
potentially liable for separate torts each time a defamatory article was viewed on its 
website, which, of course, could occur virtually anywhere in the world.114
b. The Victorian Supreme Court Opinion115
Dow Jones urged the Victorian Supreme Court to adopt the single publication rule 
as a matter of fairness and public policy.  It argued that a rule determining that 
publication on the Internet occurs whenever and wherever it was read would not only be 
unfair to publishers—forcing them to litigate in a “multitude of jurisdictions”116—but 
would also have a chilling effect on Internet speech.  Claiming that adoption of such a 
rule would inevitably lead to an increase in litigation, it reasoned that information 
providers “would become more cautious . . . reducing the uninhibited communication and 
circulation of information to an exceptionally low level.”117  The court dismissed this 
claim as speculative— “asserted but not established by evidence . . . .”118
As to the unfairness of subjecting publishers to litigation in multiple jurisdictions, 
the court responded in a passage that amounts to an outright challenge to a perceived U.S. 
legal hegemony: 
112
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 14.
113 Id. at para. 23.
114 See generally Robert M. Harkins, Jr., The Legal World Wide Web: Electronic Personal Jurisdiction in 
Commercial Litigation, or How to Expose Yourself to Liability Anywhere in the World with the Press of a 
Button, 25 PEP. L. REV. 451 (1997)
115
 [2001] VSC 305.
116 Id. at para. 73.
117 Id. at para. 16.
118 Id.
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The applicant's argument that it would be unfair for the publisher to have to 
litigate in the multitude of jurisdictions in which its statements are downloaded 
and read, must be balanced against the world-wide inconvenience caused to 
litigants, from Outer Mongolia to the Outer Barcoo, frequently not of notable 
means, who would at enormous expense and inconvenience have to embark upon 
the formidable task of suing in the USA, with its different fee and costs structures 
and where the libel laws are, in many respects, tilted in favour of defendants, or, if 
you will, in favour of the constitutional free speech concepts and rights developed 
in the USA which originated in the liberal construction by the courts of the First 
Amendment.119
This passage is emblematic of the lower court’s resistance to the notion that U.S. 
free speech norms merited any special consideration in its decision to exercise 
jurisdiction or not.  In fact, the Victorian Supreme Court clearly saw merit in 
counterbalancing the presumed legal hegemony of the United States and its laws “tilted” 
in favor of free speech.  This inclination can be detected even more clearly in the court’s 
rejection of Dow Jones argument that a rule which places jurisdiction for Internet 
defamation in the forum in which the article is accessed would create an insularity in the 
law contrary to Australian interests.120  Blanching at any suggestion that such a claim was 
anything more than a “self-indulgent” submission, “reeking of overstatement,”121 the 
court dismissed it completely.  It countered: “The point simply is that if you do publish a 
libel justiciable in another country with its own laws (not mere copies of the U.S. law as 
the defendant's submissions appear to favour, perhaps because they are tilted in favour of 
the defendant), then you may be liable . . . .”.122  Consequently, the Victorian Supreme 
Court found no reason to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.
119 Id. at para. 73.
120 Id. at para. 74.
121 Id. at para. 75.
122 Id.
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c. The Australian High Court Opinion123
Dow Jones appealed the decision and the Australian High Court affirmed the 
decision of the Victorian Supreme Court.  The High Court, like the court below, focused 
its jurisdictional analysis on the question of where the allegedly defamatory statements 
had been published.124  The High Court, however, unlike the lower court, clearly 
recognized the interrelatedness of the jurisdictional and choice of law questions in this 
case.125    According to the High Court, where the parties or events have some connection 
with a jurisdiction outside Australia, the law of the place of the wrong controls.126  Thus, 
the jurisdiction in which the defamation was “published” would control the law to be 
applied.127  Conversely, if the defamation was “published” outside of Australia, then 
foreign law would be applied.  Australia would thus become an inconvenient forum and 
the case would be dismissed.128
Dow Jones again urged the court to consider the merits of adopting a single 
publication rule, arguing that an Internet publisher should be governed by the
law of the place where it maintains its servers.129 The alternative, it claimed,
123
 [2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002).
124 Id. at paras. 25–44.
125 Id.. at para. 70 (Although these issues are separate and distinct, they are closely related.); id. at para. 110 
(“The interrelationship of the three issues in the appeal can be seen immediately. Each of the foregoing 
submissions would be relevant to the jurisdiction issue (if jurisdiction were determined only by whether a 
tort had been committed within Victoria.”).
126 Id. at para. 107 (“The rule for the ascertainment of the applicable law is therefore that it is the law where 
the tort was committed (lex loci delicti)”).
127 Id. at para. 108.
128 Id. at para. 9.
129 Id. at para. 72 ([T]he thrust of the appellant's argument was that this Court should re-examine the 
common law of defamation in Australia so as to reformulate its elements, either generally or specifically, 
for the law as it applies to publication on the Internet.).
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would force a publisher to “take account of the law of every country on earth, for there 
were no boundaries which a publisher could effectively draw to prevent anyone,
anywhere, downloading the information it put on its web server.”130
The High Court, like the lower court, rejected this argument as speculative, 
calling it a claim with “a greater appearance of certainty than it would have in fact.”131
Furthermore, it reaffirmed the conclusions of the lower court, holding that the true 
concern of defamation is damage to the plaintiff ’s reputation, and that there is no damage 
until the defamatory information is in comprehensible form in a place where the 
plaintiff’s reputation may be damaged.132  Thus, the court held that information on the 
Internet is published where the information is downloaded.133
d. Comparative Application of the U.S. Approach to Jurisdiction to Gutnick
Noticeably absent from either opinion of the Australian courts was any 
consideration of Dow Jones’ intentions in the matter at hand.  As outlined above, a U.S. 
court would be required to make that determination through an analysis of minimum 
contacts, focusing on the extent to which Dow Jones engaged in purposeful, intentional 
conduct directed toward Australia.  The lower court does acknowledge this fact, citing 
Calder for the proposition that U.S. Courts “would generally exercise jurisdiction in 
defamation actions over defendants domiciled outside the jurisdiction of the court only 
where the defendant's conduct targeted the forum.”134  The court makes no commentary 
on this point, perhaps indicating by its silence that it considered the apparent conflict of 
130 Id. at para. 20.
131 Id. at para. 21.
132 Id. at para. 44.
133 Id.
134
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 77.
26
laws to be an irreconcilable one.  Curiously, however, the High Court also cites Calder
for an inapposite proposition in favor of a determination that jurisdiction in Australia was 
appropriate.  It asserts that in Calder “personal jurisdiction over a defendant was 
exercised based on the defendant's operation of a Website accessible in the forum where 
harm was caused to the plaintiff in the forum.”135
This odd juxtaposition of propositions amounts to a misuse of Calder.  While 
Calder does stand for both propositions, they are conjunctive rather than disjunctive. 
While the placement of the effects of a defamatory statement may be a valid factor in 
considering jurisdiction, the Calder opinion never suggests that it is a substitute for or 
alternative to the basic due process analysis of purposeful availment.  In fact, in coming 
to its conclusion that California’s exercise of jurisdiction was valid, Calder emphasized 
the deliberate actions of the defendants:  “The writers’ actions were expressly aimed at 
California,” the Court observed, “and they knew that the brunt of the injury would be felt 
by [the actress] in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National 
Enquirer has its largest circulation.”136   By contrast, Dow Jones insisted that Barrons 
Online was “indelibly American, written by Americans for Americans interested in the 
stock market and its affairs” and in no way directed toward Australians.137   Rather than 
engage in any analysis of this apparent lack of intent or purpose to , the High Court 
simply countered with the observation that “Mr. Gutnick is indelibly Victorian, 
connected with no other place and that any documentation or evidence concerning the 
matter will all be found in Victoria.”138
135 Id. at para. 57.
136 Calder, 465 U.S. at 491.
137
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 129.
138 Id.
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 The fact that the number of Australian subscribers to Barrons Online was 
negligible would also be significant under a U.S. approach to Internet jurisdiction.  Out of 
550, 000 subscribers, only 1,700 (less than one-half of one percent) were located within 
Australia and a mere couple hundred were sold in the forum state of Victoria.139  Under 
Zippo, the fact that Dow Jones actually earned revenue from these subscriptions and 
assigned subscribers passwords to access their sites would mean that the Barrons Online 
could not be described as entirely passive.140  In addition, the fact that the number of 
Victorian subscribers was small would not alone be dispositive.141   However, Revell 
suggests that the fact that Australians were not the “principal users” of the website should 
be regarded as a highly relevant factor for purposes of a Zippo analysis.142
Finally, Dow Jones contact with Australia would clearly fall short of the 
minimum contacts standard put forth for Internet defamation cases in Young.  Young 
looked to the overall configuration and content of the website rather than the subject 
matter of the allegedly defamatory article to determine whether jurisdiction existed.143  In 
Gutnick, as in Young, there was no evidence that the defendant’s website was configured 
in such a way that its content could reasonably be construed as targeted toward an 
audience in the forum state.144  Indeed, it wouldn’t make sense commercially for Barrons 
to tailor content on its website for the tiny percentage of its customer base represented by 
Australians.   
139 Id. at para. 1.
140 See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123.
141 Id.
142 Revell, 317 F.3d at 475–76.
143 Young, 315 F.3d at 260.
144 Id.
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Counsel for Dow Jones emphasized the “American-ness” of Barrons Online 
website content:  Its subject matter was the American stock market, its readers were 
presumably investors interested in the American stock market, and Gutnick’s activities 
were very much relevant to the American stock market insofar as his alleged misconduct 
would affect investor conduct in publicly held enterprises with which he might be 
associated.145  Similarly, the Young court recognized that the “Connecticut-ness” of the 
defendants’ websites.146  The fact that the defendants’ website was accessible in Virginia 
would provide a basis for jurisdiction in Virginia only if they, in the court's words, 
“manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers.”147  Dow Jones clearly did not 
manifest an intent to target Australian readers.  Thus, under Young, a U.S. court would be 
compelled to decline to assert jurisdiction.
2. The Substantive Conflict
The fact that the High Court in Gutnick elected to exercise jurisdiction over Dow 
Jones brought the substantive issue of free speech norms to the fore.  The Australian High 
Court might be commended for recognizing that the case before at its core reflected a 
substantive conflict of free speech values.  At the outset of its opinion, the court 
acknowledged 
the obvious point that the law of defamation seeks to strike a balance between, on 
the one hand, society's interest in freedom of speech and the free exchange of 
information and ideas and . . . an individual's interest in maintaining his or her 
reputation.  The way in which those interests are balanced differs from society to 
society.148
The conclusion that the High Court came to, however, regarding the appropriate
145
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 129.
146 Young, 315 F.3d at 260 (noting various characteristics of the website catering to Connecticut readers).
147 Id. at 258.
148 Id. at para. 23.
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balance of these values, however, is one incompatible with American First Amendment 
values.  U.S. courts have interpreted the First Amendment’s prohibitions on restrictions 
of freedom of speech very broadly.  This broad reading reflects the “profound 
commitment” stridently to the principle “that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”149  This firm 
commitment to liberal free speech norms has resulted in substantive differences between 
the law of defamation in the United States and common law jurisdictions such as 
Australia and England.150  Most notably, in these latter jurisdictions there is no special 
protection for statements made about “public figures” such as Mr. Gutnick.151  This 
critical difference between U.S. and English/Australian law is the result of the landmark 
Supreme Court opinion New York Times v. Sullivan.152
Sullivan protects the right of the press to criticize public officials, by requiring 
that public officials suing for defamation meet a higher standard of “actual malice” to 
prevail.153   Actual malice refers to “knowledge that a statement was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”154  In further rulings, the Court has 
clarified that the standard of actual malice applies very broadly to any person who is a 
“public figure,” including politicians, celebrities, business persons, or anyone else who is 
149 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
150 See Eric P. Enson, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the First Amendment: Is the Enforcement of 
English Libel Judgments in the United States Unconstitutional?, 21 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 159. 162–
163 (outlining the differences between the English common law of defamation and American law of 
defamation).
151 Id. at 163.
152 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It 
must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”).
153 Id. at 279.
154 Id.  at 283.
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in the public eye.155  These are persons who “have assumed roles of special prominence 
in the affairs of society . . . [that] occupy positions of such persuasive power and 
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.”156  The “actual malice” 
standard makes U.S. law decidedly “tilted” in favor of defendants and free speech in 
general, as the Victorian Supreme Court clearly recognized.157
In addition, in the United States, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show 
that a statement was defamatory and false.158  Furthermore, the burden of proof is on a 
public figure plaintiff to prove actual malice by a standard of “clear and convincing” 
evidence.159   By contrast, the common law rule still followed by Australian and English 
courts presumes the falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement and requires that the 
defendant prove that the material was true.160
Because of First Amendment-derived protections, Dow Jones would likely prevail 
in a defamation suit in the United States.  Based on his widespread notoriety, Mr. Gutnick
would clearly be considered a public figure in the United States161 and would be subject 
155 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending the actual malice privilege beyond 
public officials to cover persons of public interest); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
156
 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
157
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 73.
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 613 (1977): 
(1) In an action for defamation the plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised,
(a) the defamatory character of the communication,
(b) its publication by the defendant,
(c) its application to the plaintiff,
(d) the recipient's understanding of its defamatory meaning,
(e) the recipient's understanding of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff,
(f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication,
(g) the defendant's negligence, reckless disregard or knowledge regarding the truth or falsity and the 
defamatory character of the communication, and
(h) the abuse of a conditional privilege.
159 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
160 See Enson, supra note 149, at 162 (“Under English common law, however, a plaintiff is not required to 
prove the falsity of a challenged statement, because that falsity is presumed by all English courts.”).
161 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (stating public figures are those who have “assumed roles of special 
prominence in the affairs of society”);  see also generally Erik Walker, Public Figures:  Who are They?, 45 
BAYLOR L. REV. 955 (1993).
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to a heavy burden of showing that the statements made concerning him were false and 
accompanied by “actual malice”.  In Australia, Dow Jones did not have this critical free 
speech protection, nor will any other publisher sued for defamation, a fact that accounts 
for the great dismay felt by American publishers162 as well as legal commentators163
committed to strong free protection for the American press.  In November of 2004, Dow 
Jones threw in the towel and settled its suit with Mr. Gutnick out of court, agreeing to pay 
him $180,000 and an additional $400,000 in costs.164  The outcome in Gutnick as well as 
Dow Jones’ settlement may have set a dangerous precedent, one that will unfold as more 
and more courts struggle with the issue of international Internet defamation actions.165
B. Potential Extension of Gutnick:  Harrods Limited v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.166
This dismay can only have increased with evidence, presented in the form of a 
procedural ruling in the English case of Harrods Limited v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc...  That 
case bears similarities to Dow Jones v. Gutnick that go beyond the obvious fact that Dow 
Jones is the defendant in both.  Harrods, like Gutnick, involves a suit for Internet 
defamation.  Dow Jones published an article on April 1, 2001 in both the print and online 
versions of its subsidiary newspaper, The Wall Street Journal.167  This article was written 
and published as a result of its inability to recognize that a phony press release issued by 
162 See Dodd, supra note 101 (noting the intervention of various American media groups in Gutnick).
163 See Garnett, supra note 102 (describing the criticism of the outcome in Gutnick voiced by a number of  
legal commentators).
164 See ABC News Online, Dow Jones Settles Gutnick Action, at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200411/s1242115.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005);  
165 See Australian IT, Gutnick May Set Web Precedent, at 
http://australianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,11401297%5E15319%5E%5Enbv%5E15306,00.html
(“Scholars sa[y] the decision–the first by a nation's top court to deal with alleged cross-border internet 
defamation –create[s] a global precedent that could subject internet publishers to lawsuits regardless of 
their geographical location”)(last visited Jan. 2, 2005).
166 [2003] EWHC 1162 (QB), available at
http://www.courtservice.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j1769/harrods_v_dow_jones.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005).
167 Id. at para 1.
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Harrods Department Store the day before was, in fact, an April Fool’s joke.168  The press 
release announced that Mohamed Al Fayed, owner of Harrods, planned to “float” 
Harrods.169
The word “float” was a play on words, intended to suggest that Al Fayed was 
going to take the company public, i.e. “float” its stock.  In fact, it referred to Al Fayed’s 
plans to build a ship version of Harrods, which would be moored on the Thames River.   
Get it?—A “floating” Harrods?   The Wall Street Journal did not get it and initially 
reported the story quite literally.170  It eventually caught on, however, and perhaps still 
burning from having been duped, it published another more caustic story about Harrods a 
few days later.  This story, entitled “The Enron of Britain?”, revealed the joke and added 
“If Harrods . . . ever goes public, investors would be wise to question its every 
disclosure.”171  Piqued by this unflattering comparison to Enron, the notorious emblem of 
corporate misconduct and mismanagement, Fayed and Harrods sued for defamation in 
England. 
Dow Jones responded by asking a U.S. district court in New York to issue a 
declaratory judgment protecting it from any UK judgment against and an injunction 
barring Harrods from pursuing its defamation action—not only in the UK, but in any 
other foreign jurisdiction.172  Dow Jones argued that an action for defamation based on 
the news article would not survive constitutional scrutiny in the United States because the 
publication represented only “non-actionable expression of opinion based on true 
168 Id. at para. 2.
169 Id. at para 1.
170 Id.
171 Id. at para. 3.
172 Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20743 (2d Cir., Oct. 10, 2003).
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statements.”173  British defamation law, Dow Jones argued, offered far less protection to 
publishers, and was thus “plainly antithetical to historic rules, traditions and policies 
established to protect free speech and freedom of the press in the United States.”174
The court refused Dow Jones’ request, however, explaining that as a matter of 
international comity, it would be inappropriate for a U.S. court to attempt to preempt175
the UK defamation claim—let alone any future claims that Harrods might elect to pursue 
in other jurisdictions around the world.176  On the other hand, the court stated that it 
would have “little hesitation” in issuing a declaration of non-recognition of an 
existing UK court judgment against Dow Jones.177  In doing so, the court reaffirmed a 
commitment to U.S. free speech norms, stating “the United States has a profound interest 
in fostering its broad concept of First Amendment freedoms, and safeguarding the freest 
exercise of those fundamental rights within the United States by all persons accorded the 
protection of American law.”178
After the U.S. District Court refused to issue a declaratory judgment, the matter 
reached the High Court of Justice in London.  The High Court noted that the allegedly 
defamatory article did not appear in the European edition of the Wall Street Journal, the 
edition that reached most British readers.179  It cited evidence that only ten copies were 
173 Id. at 402.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 418.  (“What Dow Jones asks this Court to do, in general terms distills to this: to apply the DJA as 
a defensive shield, a preemptive means to immunize a litigant from the inevitable costs and inconveniences 
attendant to any form of potential litigation arising from the party’s alleged wrongful acts.”).
176 Id. at 410–12 * 9 (“Under Dow Jones’ hypothesis, the Declaratory Judgment Act would confer upon an 
American court a preemptive style of global jurisdiction branching worldwide and able to strike down
offending litigation anywhere on Earth.  Intriguing as such universal power might appear to any federal 
judge, this Court must take a more modest view of the limits of its jurisdiction.”).
177 Id. (noting that it would be willing to declare that a foreign judicial order “actually rendered and sought 
to be executed in the United States would not be cognizable under American jurisprudence governing 
freedom of expression.”).  
178 Id. at *19.
179 [2003] EWHC 1162 at para. 4.
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sent to subscribers in the U.K. from the U.S..180  As for the online edition, the court 
conceded that the evidence “discloses a very small number of ‘hits’ on the article as 
published on the web” and contrasted this evidence with the fact that The Wall Street 
Journal has a national distribution within the United States of approximately 1.8 million 
copies.181
One might expect these factors to weigh heavily in favor of declining jurisdiction, 
as they would under an American minimum contacts analysis.  However, the London 
High Court, citing Gutnick as one authority, concluded that “the publications . . . have 
taken place within this jurisdiction. That applies both to the small number of copies of 
The Wall Street Journal received by subscribers here and also to the apparently limited 
number of hits emanating from this jurisdiction on the relevant page of the web site.”182
Though the case has yet to go to trial, this procedural ruling means that Dow Jones will 
be subject to the English law of defamation, which like Australian defamation law, lacks 
the protections outlined above for speech about public figures.183
C. Implications of the Dow Jones Decisions
Defense counsel for Dow Jones in Gutnick argued strenuously for a narrow, 
speech-protecting rule in the “age of globalization,”184 an argument that the Victorian 
Supreme Court dismissed as merely self-serving185 and the Australian High Court found 
ultimately unpersuasive.186  While clearly self-serving, this argument was still a valid 
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at para. 36.
183 See supra text accompanying footnotes 160–64.
184
 [2001] VSC 305 at para 74.  
185 Id. at para. 75 (dismissing the policy arguments of Dow Jones as “self-indulgent submissions”).
186
 [2002] HCA 56 at para. 164–66.  The High Court took a more nuanced approach in its response to the 
proposition that the nature of Internet communication called for a rethinking of old doctrines, noting that 
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one, and arguably prescient.  The Internet truly is a revolutionary tool for dissemination 
of information, one that allows content to be received anywhere and everywhere that an 
Internet connection is available.187  As a result, individuals nearly anywhere in the world 
individuals could access the material placed by Dow Jones on its web servers.188
Standing on its own, Gutnick is flawed in its failure to recognize that old jurisdictional 
rules are ill-suited for addressing the unique challenge posed by a radical new physically-
unconstrained medium for communication.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, 
the Internet is “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human 
communication.”189
If the basic ruling of Gutnick—that publication of a defamatory communication 
occurs where it is received— is followed to its logical end, then Internet publishers could 
be held liable, again, anywhere and everywhere.190  It is true that the risk of publishers 
having to defend defamation actions around the world is somewhat mitigated by 
significant practical obstacles to such a development.  For example, as discussed infra 
Part IV, plaintiffs are unlikely to go to the expense of suing for defamation unless any 
judgment they obtain is capable of being enforced in a place where the defendant has 
assets.  Nevertheless, it is entirely plausible to conclude that Internet publishers, facing 
the prospect of increased liability, will make adjustments to reduce their exposure.   Self-
‘[i]ntuition suggests that the remarkable features of the Internet (which is still changing and expanding) 
makes it more than simply another medium of human communication” and acknowledging that its 
conclusion was an “outcome contrary to intuition.”  Id. at 164.
187 See Titi Nguyen, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 519  (2004) (noting that “any person connected to the 
Internet can access it and is limited in her activity only by the current state of technology”).
188 See Larry Press, The State of the Internet:  Growths and Gaps, at
http://www.isoc.org/inet2000/cdproceedings/8e/8e_4.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005), for evidence of the 
global diffusion of the Internet;  see also 
189 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
190 See Digital Equip. Corp., 960 F. Supp. at 462  (“To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is 
concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ ‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.).
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censorship is one of the surest, most practical means of accomplishing this objective and 
American media outlets have responded to the threat of liability in such a manner in the 
past.191  Thus, the notion that a chill on free speech could occur as a result of Gutnick is 
not just a “high-minded concept” or “self-indulgent submission”192 but a very real 
possibility.   Long before Gutnick, one commentator noted that “perhaps the most 
complex threat to the new communications technology may come from governmental 
entities that are not subject to the First Amendment.”193   To the extent countries outside
the United States take the position that they have jurisdiction over any communication 
that is downloaded within their borders, Internet content providers may find that they 
cannot rely upon the relatively high level of protection they enjoy in the United States.  
IV. REFUSING ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ADVERSE TO U.S. PUBLIC 
POLICY:  A POSSIBLE ANTIDOTE TO THE DOW JONES PRECEDENT?
As suggested by the U.S. District Court’s opinion in Dow Jones v. Harrods, 
American courts may still have a role to play in the unfolding conflict of transnational 
free speech norms.194 American publishers generally have the majority of their assets in 
the U.S. and victorious defamation plaintiffs abroad can only access these assets through 
191
 In late 1995, for example, CompuServe, Inc. blocked access to more than 200 sexually explicit computer 
discussion groups after a federal prosecutor in Germany stated that the material violated German
pornography laws. See John Markoff, The Media Business: On-Line Service Blocks Access to Topics 
Called Pornographic, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1995, at A1.
192
 [2001] VSC 305 at para. 74.
193 E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. REV. 319, 329 (1996).
194 Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d at 411:
American law contains among the most extensive mantle of rights and safeguards to guarantee and 
protect individual freedoms and fundamental fairness. Gauged by the rigorous standards 
constituting the American conception of civil liberties and due process, the legal systems of many 
foreign states are bound to fall short as to any given basic precept our law encompasses. 
Accordingly, countless occasions inevitably arise when Americans are sued in foreign tribunals by 
parties invoking laws that in some aspect or other may not measure up to our constitutional mark 
or may even do violence to public policies and principles Americans hold dear —not only those 
valued under the First Amendment, but under other vital protections of our jurisprudence.
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a ruling by an American court agreeing to enforce the judgment.195  Enforceability is 
treated as a question of state law, and over thirty states have adopted versions of the 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act, which provides that a foreign money judgment 
“that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered . . . is conclusive between 
the parties  . . . .”196 This general rule of enforceability is subject to limitations, 
however, and one exception, the “public policy” exception represents a sort of rear guard 
action against the erosion of U.S. free speech protections by foreign defamation 
judgments.197  This exception allows courts to refuse enforcement when the cause of 
action or claim for relief on which the judgment rests is “repugnant to the public policy of 
[the enforcing] state.”198
A. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc and Telnikoff v. Matusevich
U.S. courts have refused to enforce foreign defamation judgments determined to 
be inconsistent with the constitutional protections of New York Times v. Sullivan and its 
progeny.  Two leading cases—Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.199and 
Telnikoff v. Matusevich200—suggest possible responses to an adverse ruling in either Dow 
Jones defamation cases by American courts.  In Bachchan, a New York state court 
refused to enforce an English defamation judgment against the operator of a New York 
news wire service, declaring that “the protection to free speech and the press embodied in 
[the First Amendment] would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel 
judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered 
195 See generally Molly Shafer Van Houweling, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the First Amendment, 
and Internet Speech:  Notes for the Next Yahoo! v. Licra, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697 (2003).
196 Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 263, at 2 (1962).
197 Id. at 4.
198 Id..
199
 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. S. Ct.  1992).
200 Id. at 235.
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antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”201  Likewise, 
in Matusevich, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declared that an English defamation 
judgment could not be enforced in Maryland because “the principles governing 
defamation actions under English law . . . are so contrary to Maryland defamation law, 
and to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law.”202
B. Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA
In addition, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme 
(LICRA),203 represents strong authority at the federal level for refusing to enforce a 
foreign judgment inconsistent with American free speech norms.  In that case, a U.S. 
district court in California refused to declare enforceable a French ruling against the 
popular website Yahoo! for allowing the display of Nazi memorabilia on its website in 
violation of French law.  In doing so, it recognized that “the French order's content and 
viewpoint-based regulation of the web pages and auction site on Yahoo.com . . . clearly 
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United 
States.”204  Further, the court rejected any notion that principles of comity between 
nations obliged it to recognize the French judgment: “Absent a body of law that 
establishes international standards with respect to speech on the Internet . . .  the principle 
of comity is outweighed by the Court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.”205
Collectively, these cases provide a powerful rationale for refusing to enforce 
adverse judgments on the merits (should they be adverse) against Dow Jones.  The 
201 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997), answer conformed to 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10628 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1998).
202 Id. at 249.
203 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
204 Id. at 1191.
205 Id. at 1194.
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various differences in the substantive law of defamation between America on the one 
hand and Australia and England on the other, are not insignificant.  The absence of a 
requirement of an “actual malice” showing alone is enough to make the common law of 
defamation embraced in Australia and England fundamentally incompatible with the First 
Amendment as modified by Sullivan.  Thus, Dow Jones or a similarly situated defendant 
may ultimately find relief in a domestic court from an adverse ruling abroad.  
C. U.S. Courts May Prevent the Further Erosion of Internet Free Speech Norms 
Likewise, proponents of robust free speech/free press protections may take solace 
in the possibility that their interests will be vindicated by a court following the mandates 
of the First Amendment.  The need for judicial protection of First Amendment values 
internationally is underscored by the apparent lack of a viable political solution.  Though 
international conventions addressing free speech norms on the Internet exist, these 
conventions are restrictive from a U.S. perspective206 and no such agreement has been 
made concerning free speech norms as applied to defamation.  Moreover, such an 
international political solution is arguably unrealistic and undesirable from an American 
free speech perspective.  Even assuming any consensus could be created internationally 
concerning general standards of free speech, these standards are unlikely to guarantee the 
exceptionally high level of free press protection that exists in the United States.207  As the 
two Dow Jones and Yahoo! cases make clear, even the most liberal of Western 
democracies do not share ideals of free speech as expansive as those espoused in the 
United States.  Furthermore, a significant number of non-Western, non-democratic 
206 See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts 
of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer Systems, opened for signature Jan. 28, 
2003, Europ. T.S. No. 189 (providing criminal sanctions for “hate speech”).
207 See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods
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nations embrace state censorship of free speech on the Internet208 and are unlikely to find 
American arguments to the contrary persuasive, at least in the short term.
 In the absence of a political solution, legal scholars have begun to more 
aggressively call upon national courts to provide a solution.209  As Matusevich, Bachnan, 
and Yahoo! indicate, at least a few American courts have been willing to “step[] into the 
gap, using judicial interpretations of jurisdiction and judicial comity to champion [the 
American] approach to balancing competing norms on transnational speech.”  Of course, 
no U.S. court enjoys more prestige or commands more respect internationally than the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Although the Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to 
champion American free speech / free press norms in the context of international Internet 
defamation, remarks by Justice Scalia and Breyer suggest that perhaps they are 
sharpening their swords for just such an occasion.  In the course of an informal discussion 
held at American University on the use of foreign law precedent in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence,210 the following exchange occurred:
Questioner (Referring to Dow Jones v. Gutnick): Do U.S. courts cooperate with 
illiberal policies by enforcing foreign judgments against Americans for speech 
that would definitely be protected here in the U.S? 
Justice Scalia   That’s a very interesting question, uh . . . (pause, laughter).  What 
do you think the answer is?  (smirking, more laughter)
Questioner:  The answer is yes. I’ll send you one of my law students as a clerk.
208 See, e.g., Alfred Hermida, Behind China's Internet Red Firewall, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION , 
Sept. 3, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/technology/2234154.stm (“[China] has worked hard 
to muzzle the web as a forum for free information and discussion. One of the ways it does this is by 
blocking access to foreign websites such as Google by what has been called the Great Red Firewall.”); 
Lewis S. Malakoff, Are You My Mommy, or My Big Brother? Comparing Internet Censorship in Singapore 
and the United States, 8 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 423 (1999); 
209 See, e.g., Johnson D & Post D, And How Shall the Net Be Governed? A Meditation on the Relative 
Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in Brian Fitzgerald et al, CYBERLAW 124 (2002)
210
 CNN Broadcast, Foreign Courts and U.S. Constitutional Law, Jan. 13, 2005 (on file with author).
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Justice Scalia:  It really is a great problem.  We haven’t been confronted with a 
case involving it yet, but when the case comes up we will indeed . . .
Justice Breyer (interrupting):  We will give it our serious consideration (laughter).
Justice Scalia:  The one thing you can be sure is we will get it right (more 
laughter).
The impression one is left with upon viewing this exchange is that the “right 
answer”, at least as Justices Scalia and Breyer are concerned, is to refuse to recognize any 
foreign judgment deemed incompatible with U.S. free speech norms.  It may only be a 
matter of time before the U.S. Supreme Court has an opportunity to give more substance 
to this impression.  
V. CONCLUSION
Dow Jones v. Gutnick  has thrown into relief the difficult procedural and 
substantive issues the U.S. will need to resolve as Internet publishing becomes more and 
more important as a medium for mass, global communication.  The consequences of 
failing to address these challenges could be considerable.  The mere prospect of 
expensive litigation in multiple, far flung jurisdictions and exposure to inconsistent 
regulation is likely to have a substantial “chilling effect” on  what may well be “the most 
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has 
yet seen.”211  Risk-averse Internet publishers will need to adhere to the most restrictive 
international standards of free speech to avoid liability.  Furthermore, if a publisher has to 
consider the laws of Australia (or Singapore, China, Saudi Arabia, etc . . .) when 
publishing, his or her level of speech protection is reduced to that of the potential forum 
211 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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state.   As Dow Jones's general counsel observed, “it creates a kind of tyranny of the 
lowest common denominator and . . . inhibits free speech.”212
Finally, perhaps the most damning observation regarding defamation lawsuits in 
foreign courts is that they often represent an “end run” around the First Amendment and 
New York Times v. Sullivan, as few foreign jurisdictions recognize the heightened 
protections against charges of defamation guaranteed by that case in the United States.213
These protections will be greatly diminished in value unless they are transplanted from 
the printed to electronic medium, which soon could be a dominant mode of news 
distribution.  Thus, as American publishers push into the frontiers of Internet publishing, 
U.S. courts should wield New York Times v. Sullivan as both sword and shield to protect 
them against free speech norms antithetical to our own “profound national commitment 
to the principle debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”214
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